

Bureaucracy and Institutions

Seminar
Bureaucracy and Institutions
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Office Hours: by appointment

Session	Week	Topic
0	21.04.	Syllabus, Schedule's Discussion, and Other Organisational Aspects
1	03.06.	Institutional Frame and State Institutions
2	15.07.	Politics vs. Bureaucrats
3	16.07.	Bureaucracy and its Challenges

Course Description

Bureaucracy, as the non-elected branch of the state dealing with its administration, has been central to a better understanding of policy-making within democratic and even authoritarian societies. Its role in the institutional frame is essential to comprehend better how state institutions work. In this course, we will look at studies that empirically deal with this bureaucratic endeavour. We will examine questions as the dynamics of control: politics vs. bureaucrats; the provision of public goods via the administration of the state; or, prone bureaucracy problems within institutions. Finally, we will look at how bureaucratic procedures may undermine or support institutional interactions.

Seminar Goals:

1. The overall objective of this seminar is to provide a strong and solid knowledge on the grounds of Bureaucracy and Institutions.
2. To improve critical and analytical thinking is expected from the participants of these classes using theories and test them empirically.

Seminar Expectations:

1. Class attendance is mandatory. In case of compelling reason(s) for non-attendance **I expect you to notify me** before, even within the one time possibility. In case that this does not happens, your permanence in the class can be compromised.

2. The readings are to be prepared in advance.
3. Active participation in class is important to improve the understanding of the presented perspectives.
4. The seminar will be taught in English.

Seminar Characteristics and Requirements:

1. This seminar will be put together with my guidance, presentations, group activities and in-class discussions.
2. In the days of block seminar we will start at 9:30, stop at noon for half an one hour of lunch break, restart at 12:30 and end between 15:00 and 15:30.
3. There are two different levels of grading in this seminar.¹ They are:
 - Regarding the normal attendance of the seminar and **mandatory to all**. It implies a short analysis (no more than three A4 pages, font size 12, one space and a half) where you resume the main arguments of the paper you will present (or another at your choice) and an additional paper of your choice related with it (this second paper should not be none of the texts present in the syllabus). It should be written in English and it shall be delivered at the latest at 23:55 of **15.08.2016** (this can be done by e-mail).
 - Only mandatory to the ones that choose to do the *Modularbeit* in this seminar. This is a final paper² (with a maximum of 20 pages, all included, A4, font size 12, one space and a half). It should be written in English and it shall be delivered until 23:55 of **15.09.2016** (this can be done by e-mail). The structure of the paper has to be discussed with the instructor and implies the delivery of an A4 page with an abstract.³ The final paper should identify a research question, with respective explanations and the proposes and strategies to answer that question. I expect the seminar participants to read and discuss international literature. Empirical work will be more than welcome and valorised.
 - **All the activities in class, apart from the final paper, are not graded, but they are mandatory.**
4. Because of the University schedules, I will just be able to supervise you during the present term. The students that choose to write a paper later than that would have to do it autonomously without my advice. In these, cases it will be Professor Best to grade the papers and **he will not give advise** in the making of them, with the exception of cases like illness, child care, and so on.
5. I expect that the final paper results from your original work and that it does not involve academic dishonesty (falsification, forgery, multiple submission, plagiarism, etc.).

¹For indications about how to cite and other formal details please see the Sociology webpage at: <https://www.sowi.uni-kl.de/soziologie/startseite/>

²The topic and structure of the paper shall be previously discussed with the instructor.

³This should be delivered until the **15.06.2016**. It should contain a provisory title, a research question, a small abstract and a few base references.

Seminar Structure:

22.04.2016 - Syllabus, Schedule's Discussion, and Other Organisational Aspects

BLOCK 1:

03.06.2016 - Institutional Frame and State Institutions

- *Readings:* Huber and Shipan (2002); Lewis (2008); DiMaggio and Powell (1983); Baker, Jensen, and Murphy (1988); Moe (1990); Steve Callander (2008) ; Lindblom (1959) ; Olsen (2007)
- Presentation and discussion of the readings;
- Group work.

BLOCK 2:

15.07.2016 - Politics vs. Bureaucrats

- *Readings:* Bertelli and Grose (2007); Clinton and Lewis (2008); Dessein (2002); McCubbins, Noll and Weingast (1987); Ting (2002); McCubbins, Noll and Weingast (1999);
- Presentation and discussion of the readings;
- Group work.

BLOCK 3:

16.07.2016 - Bureaucracy and its Challenges

- *Readings:* Bawn (1995); DeFigueiredo etc al (1999); Prendergast (2003); Gailmard and Patty (2007); Heimann (1993); Nixon (2004);
- Presentation and discussion of the readings;
- Group work.

Readings:⁴

1. Books and Book Chapters

- Booth, Wayne C., Colomb, Gregory G. and Williams, Joseph M. (2008) *The Craft of Research*, Chicago: Chicago University Press (selected chapters).
- Carpenter, Daniel (2001) *The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy*, Princeton: Princeton University Press (selected chapters).
- Epstein, David and O'Halloran, Sharyn (1999) *Delegating Powers*, New York: Cambridge University Press (selected chapters).
- Huber, John D. and Shipan, Charles R. (2002) *Deliberate Discretion: The Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (selected chapters).
- Geddes, Barbara (2003) *Paradigms and Sand Castles: Theory Building and Research Design in Comparative Politics* Ann Harbor, MI: University of Michigan Press (selected chapters).
- Gerring, John (2008) "Case Selection for Case Study Analysis: Qualitative and Quantitative Techniques", in Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier, Henry E. Brady and David Collier (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology*, Oxford: Oxford University Press (selected chapters).
- Goertz, Gary (2006) *Social Science Concepts: A User's Guide*, Princeton: Princeton University Press (selected chapters).
- King, Gary, Keohane, Robert O. and Verba, Sidney (eds.) (1994) *Designing Social Enquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*, Princeton: Princeton University Press (selected chapters).
- Lewis, David E. (2008) *The Politics of Presidential Appointments: Political Control and Bureaucratic Performance* Princeton: Princeton University Press (selected chapters).
- Moe (1990) "The Politics of Structural Choice: Towards a Theory of Public Bureaucracy", in Williamson, Oliver (ed.), *Organization Theory*, pp. 116-153, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

⁴All the readings will be available at the online platform (OLAT).

- Shively, W. Phillips (2013) *The Craft of Political Research*, New Jersey: Pearson (selected chapters).

2. Articles

- Allen, F., Babus, A. and Carletti, E. (2009) "Financial crises: Theory and evidence", *Annual Review of Financial Economics*, Annual Reviews, 1(11), 97-116.
- Alchian, Armen and Demsetz, Harold (1972) "Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization", *American Economic Review*, 62(5): 777-795.
- Alesina, Alberto and Tabellini, Guido (2007) "Bureaucrats or Politicians I: A Single Policy Task", *American Economic Review*, 3(97): 169-179.
- Baker, George P., Jensen, Michael J. and Murphy, Kevin J. (1988) "Compensation and Incentives: Practice vs. Theory", *Journal of Finance*, 43(3): 593-616.
- Bawn, Kathleen (1995) "Political Control versus Expertise: Congressional Choices about Administrative Procedures", *American Political Science Review* 89(1): 62-73.
- Bawn, Kathleen (1997) "Choosing Strategies to Control the Bureaucracy: Statutory Constraints, Oversight, and the Committee System" *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization*, 13(1): 101-126.
- Bennett, Andrew and Elman, Colin (2007) "Case Study Methods in the International Relations Subfield", *Comparative Political Studies*, 40 (2), February, 170-195.
- Bernstein, S., Lebow, R.N., Stein J.G. and Weber, S. (2000) "God gave physics the easy problems: Adapting social science to an unpredictable world", *European Journal of International Relations*, 6 (1): 43-76.
- Bertelli, Anthony and Grose, Christian (2007) "Agreeable Administrators? Analyzing the Public Positions of Cabinet Secretaries and Presidents", *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 37(2): 228.
- Besley, Tim and Burgess, Robin (2002) "The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness: Theory and Evidence from India", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 117: 4, 1415-1451.
- Callander, Steve (2008) "A Theory of Policy Expertise", *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 3(2): 123-140.

- Calvert, Randall, McCubbins, Mathew D. and Weingast, Barry R. (1989) "A Theory of Political Control and Agency Discretion", *American Journal of Political Science*, 33(3): 588-611.
- Clinton, Joshua and Lewis, David E. (2008) "Expert Opinion, Agency Characteristics, and Agency Preferences", *Political Analysis*, 16(1): 3-20.
- DeFigueiredo, Rui, Spiller, Pablo and Urbiztondo, Santiago (1999) "An Informational Perspective on Administrative Procedures", *Journal Of Law, Economics, and Organization*, 15(1): 283-305.
- Dessein, Wouter (2002) "Authority and Communication in Organizations", *Review of Economic Studies*, 69(4): 811-838.
- Diermeier, Daniel and Krehbiel, Keith (2003) "Institutionalism as a Methodology", *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 15(2):123-144.
- DiMaggio, Paul and Powell, Walter (1983) "The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields", *American Sociological Review*, 48(2): 147.
- Dixit, Avinash (2002) "Incentives and Organizations in the Public Sector: An Interpretative Review", *Journal of Human Resources* 37(4): 696-727.
- Ferejohn, John and Shipan, Charles (1990) "Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy", *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 6(3): 1-20.
- Gandhi, Jennifer and Przeworski, Adam (2006) "Cooperation, cooptation, and rebellion under dictatorships", *Economics and Politics*, 18(1): 1-26.
- Gailmard, Sean (2002) "Expertise, Subversion, and Bureaucratic Discretion", *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 18(2): 536-535.
- Gailmard, Sean and Patty, John (2007) "Slackers and Zealots: Civil Service, Policy Discretion, and Bureaucratic Expertise", *American Journal of Political Science* 51(4): 873-889.
- Gailmard, Sean and Patty, John (2009), "Separation of Powers, Information, and Bureaucratic Structure", Working-Paper.
- Gerring, John (2004) "What Is a Case Study and What Is It Good for?", *The American Political Science Review*, 98: 2, May, 341-354.

- Heimann, C.F. Larry (1993) "Understanding the Challenger Disaster: Organizational Structure and the Design of Reliable Systems", *American Political Science Review*, 87:421-35.
- Huber, John and McCarty, Nolan (2004) "Bureaucratic capacity, delegation, and political reform", *American Political Science Review*, 98(3): 481-494.
- Kunicova, Jana and Rose-Ackerman, Susan (2005) "Electoral rules and constitutional structures as constraints on corruption", *British Journal of Political Science*, 35(4): 3-23.
- Knopf, Jeffrey W. (2006) "Doing a Literature Review", *PS: Political Science and Politics*, 39: 127-132.
- Lindblom, Charles (1959) "The Science of Muddling Through", *Public Administration Review*, 19(2): 79-88.
- Olsen, Johan P. (2007) "Garbage Cans, New Institutionalism, and the Study of Politics", *American Political Science Review*, 95(1): 191-198.
- Marschke, Gerald and Courty, Pascal (1997) "Measuring Government Performance: Lessons from a Federal Bureaucracy", *American Economic Review* 87(2): 383-388.
- McCubbins, Mathew D., Noll, Roger G. and Weingast, Barry R. (1987) "Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control", *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 3(2): 243-277.
- McCubbins, Mathew D., Noll, Roger G. and Weingast, Barry R. (1999) "The Political Origins of the Administrative Procedure Act", *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 15(1): 180-217.
- Myerson, Roger B. (2008) "The autocrat's credibility problem and foundations of the constitutional state", *The American Political Science Review*, 102(1): 125-139.
- Nixon, David C. (2004) "Separation of Powers and Appointee Ideology", *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization*, 20(2):438-457.
- Prendergast, Canice (2003) "The Limits of Bureaucratic Efficiency", *Journal of Political Economy* 111(5): 929-958.

- Przeworski, Adam (2005) "Democracy as an equilibrium", *Public Choice*, 123: 253-273.
- Rauch, James E. and Evans, Peter B. (2000) "Bureaucratic structure and bureaucratic performance in less developed countries", *Journal of Public Economics*, 75: 49-71.
- Stasavage, David (2004) "Open door or closed door? Transparency in domestic and international bargaining", *International Organization*, 58: 667-703.
- Tilly, Charles (1995) "To Explain Political Processes", *The American Journal of Sociology*, 100(6): 1594-610.
- Ting, Michael (2002) "A Theory of Jurisdictional Assignments in Bureaucracy", *American Journal of Political Science*, 46(2): 364-378.
- Weingast, Barry R., Shepsle, Kenneth A. and Johnson, Christopher (1981) "The political economy of benefits and costs: A neoclassical approach to distributive politics", *Journal of Political Economy*, 89(4): 642-664.
- Wood, Dan and Waterman, Richard (1991) "The Dynamics of Political Control of the Bureaucracy", *American Political Science Review*, 85(3): 801-828.